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ABSTRACT 
This paper contributes to the debate on the origins of modern 
economic growth in Europe from a very long run perspective using 
econometric techniques that allow for a long-range dependence 
approach. Different regimes, defined by endogenously estimated 
structural shocks, coincided with episodes of pandemics and war. The 
most persistent shocks occurred at the time of the Black Death and 
the twentieth century’s world wars. Our findings confirm that the 
Black Death often resulted in higher income levels, but reject the view 
of a uniform long-term response to the Plague while evidence a 
negative reaction in non-Malthusian economies. Positive trend 
growth in output per head and population took place in the North Sea 
Area (Britain and the Low Countries) since the Plague. A gap 
between the North Sea Area and the rest of Europe, the Little 
Divergence, emerged between the early seventeenth century and the 
Napoleonic Wars lending support to Broadberry-van Zanden’s 
interpretation. 
JEL Codes: E01, N10, N30, N40, O10, O47 
Keywords: Long-run Growth, Little Divergence, War, 
Pandemics, Malthusian 
 Universidad Carlos III and CEPR. leandro.prados.delaescosura@uc3m.es 
† Dept of Statistics, ITAM, Mexico, and CREATES, Aarhus University. vladimir.rodriguez@itam.mx 
I. Introduction
When does modern economic growth, namely, a sustained increase in output per 
head or worked hour, accompanied by population expansion (Kuznets, 1966), emerge? 
Economists have tried to explain the transition from a society in which average income 
is stagnant to another in which its levels increase irreversibly over time (Hansen and 
Prescott, 2002). This approach assumes no sustained improvement in material living 
standards before 1820, when the First Industrial Revolution spread over Western 
Europe. The Unified Growth Theory, that models the transition from a Malthusian 
economy -in which land is in fixed supply, capital accumulation and technological 
change proceed very slowly, and any increase in output per head triggers a direct 
response of population- to a modern economy, provides a more nuanced approach that 
allows for mild per capita income growth in a late stage (Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor, 
2011).  
Does historical evidence support such a dichotomy of stagnation or growth? A 
strict Malthusian depiction of the pre-Industrial Revolution era, with no long-term gains 
in living standards, has been supported by economic historians (cf. Clark, 2007). New 
quantitative research on preindustrial European economies has found, however, 
episodes of sustained growth that, although often reverted, led to higher levels of 
income per head (van Zanden and van Leewen, 2012; Broadberry et al., 2015; Krantz, 
2019; Prados de la Escosura et al., 2020). Would it be preferable, then, to describe 
European preindustrial economic performance, rather than as Malthusian, as a series of 
growth reversal episodes, in which increases in average incomes are largely cancelled 
out by subsequent episodes of decline (Cf. Broadberry and Wallis (2017)? Or should 
these ‘efflorescence’ (Goldstone, 2002) or ‘growth recurring’ (Jones, 1988) episodes be 
better depicted as a weak version of the Malthusian model?  
The new quantitative evidence provides the grounds for a new interpretation that 
claims that the sustained economic growth in Western Europe since 1820 sinks its roots 
in the centuries between the Black Death and the Napoleonic Wars (Broadberry, 2013; 
de Pleijt and van Zanden, 2019). This experience would have been restricted to some 
regions in north-western Europe, including Flanders, Holland, England and Wales, and 
Scotland, that became increasingly integrated into an economic unit, the North Sea 
Area. In the North Sea Area a distinctive reaction to the Black Death resulted in higher 
permanent income levels. Moreover, the North Sea Area exhibited over time differences 
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in terms of demographic patterns (the European Marriage Pattern), human capital 
formation, institutions (commodity and factor markets, Parliaments), and international 
trade (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Broadberry, 2013; de Moor and van Zanden, 2010; de 
Pleijt and van Zanden, 2016, 2019; van Zanden et al., 2012). Such a transformation, 
eventually facilitated the launching of the Industrial Revolution. 
As a consequence of this successful growth process, a growing gap in terms of 
income per head and structural change emerged between the North Sea Area and the 
rest of continental Europe, the so-called Little Divergence. The Little Divergence also 
carried with it a reversal of fortunes as Britain and the Netherlands exchanged positions 
with earlier leading economies, such as Italy and Spain (Fouquet and Broadberry, 2015; 
Henriques and Palma, 2019). 
The emergence of the Little Divergence has implications for the global debate on 
the origins of the Great Divergence, namely, the increasing gap in average incomes 
between Europe and Asia. The early rise of the North Sea Area implies that the roots of 
the Great Divergence go back to the Black Death aftermath and the European overseas 
expansion. Such an interpretation, in line with the view of an earlier European primacy 
supported by Braudel (1973), Jones (1981), or Maddison (2007), challenges the 
interpretation by California School - including, among others, Frank (1998), Pomeranz 
(2000), and Goldstone (2002, 2019)-, which dates the beginnings of the Great 
Divergence at the onset of industrialization in north-western Europe.   
In a nutshell, the issue at stake is whether modern economic growth was initiated 
in north-western Europe before the late eighteenth century. While in Broadberry-van 
Zanden’s narrative, slow but sustained per capita income growth since 1348, 
accompanied by structural transformation, made the North Sea Area to forge ahead the 
rest of Europe and Asia, according to the California School, continuous gains in average 
incomes along population expansion were absent in Europe until as late as 1750. The 
episodes of growth observed in north-western Europe were not significantly different 
from previous ‘efflorescence’ experiences, just isolated and short phenomena that, when 
exhausted, led to another Malthusian equilibrium (Goldstone, 2002). Thus, no thriving 
North Sea Area would have existed before 1750. The Netherlands stagnated after its 
Golden Age and Britain’s per capita income only improved in the late 14th and 17th 
centuries at times of population decline or stagnation. Furthermore, the income levels 
achieved in Holland or England before 1800 were not different from those reached in 
Renaissance Italy or Song China (Goldstone, 2019).  
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The relevance of the new evidence and interpretation for European and global 
economic history is clear. However, the debate has not been accompanied by formal 
statistical procedures and testing. Historical analysis of European long run growth and 
the Little Divergence has been mainly impressionistic so far. This implies that the 
current narrative on growth and divergence can be easily challenged.  
The availability of GDP per head series for Western European countries since 
the late middle ages provides a unique opportunity to investigate growth in the very 
long run. The Black Death, the beginning of the overseas expansion in 1500, and the 
Industrial Revolution are considered events that contributed to growth and divergence 
across Europe (Pamuk, 2007; Broadberry, 2013; de Pleijt and van Zanden, 2016, 2019; 
Jedwab et al. 2019). Wars have been also associated to changes in growth and 
leadership within Europe (Voigtländer and Voth, 2013a; O’Brien, 2018). Can the 
impact on growth and divergence of such events be assessed more rigorously with the 
help of modern quantitative techniques? 
Crafts and Mills (2017) employed time-series analysis to investigate whether 
British long-run economic growth followed a segmented trend-stationary process, in 
which shocks have transitory effects and the series have mean reversion, that is, series 
reverts to the trend line almost immediately after the occurrence of the shock, or a 
difference stationary process, in which shocks have permanent effects on the series, and 
also, whether different data generating processes apply before and after the Industrial 
Revolution. A cubic segmented trend stationary model provides, according to Crafts and 
Mills, the best depiction of Britain’s performance over six centuries. Their main finding 
is that zero trend growth prior to 1660 was followed by accelerations before and after 
the Industrial Revolution. This implies anticipating the onset of modern economic 
growth by nearly a century with respect to Goldstone’s (2019) assessment. Moreover, 
their results lend support to Galor’s (2011) two-stage growth acceleration and to 
Voigtländer and Voth’s (2013b) depiction of the Black Death as an exogenous shock 
that allowed higher permanent income levels. 
This paper contributes to the literature on long run growth and the Little 
Divergence in Europe by using time-series analysis but, rather than following Crafts and 
Mills (2017), we have opted for a long-range dependence approach (also known as long 
memory or fractional time series analysis) in which persistence levels of different 
shocks may vary. In this sense, we relax the view that shocks may vanish in the short 
term, or on the contrary, they may be permanent and, consequently, never die out. Also, 
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following Crafts and Mills (2017), we investigate whether some historical events 
provoke structural breaks in the trend of the series, and then define regimes with 
different levels of persistence. Our results show that regimes, defined by the 
endogenously estimated structural breaks at roughly similar dates for practically all 
countries, often coincide with episodes of pandemics and war. Moreover, we establish 
the persistence of the different shocks showing that the most persistent ones occurred at 
the time of the Black Death and the twentieth century’s world wars. 
 Secondly, our findings confirm that the Black Death often resulted in higher 
income levels but reject the view of a uniform positive long-term response to the 
Plague. The higher income levels achieved were partly reverted (Italy), or became 
permanent (Britain, France, the Netherlands). Moreover, frontier economies reacted 
negatively to the Black Death and average income levels experienced a long run decline 
(Spain and Sweden).  
Thirdly, we have investigated the extent to which countries in Europe behaved 
in a conventional Malthusian fashion since the Black Death. While inversely related 
tendencies in average incomes and population confirm the Malthusian pattern in most 
cases, the time frame is different across countries. Moreover, we also found population 
and output per head evolving alongside, at odds with the Malthusian paradigm, in the 
case of Spain.     
Fourthly, the paper contributes to the debate about the origins of modern 
economic growth in Europe. Unlike most European countries, trend growth in per capita 
income occurred in Britain since the early 1600s, and represented a sustained process in 
the Netherlands since Black Death. Furthermore, neither the Low Countries nor Britain 
did suffer growth reversals (that is, phases of negative trend growth). If we focus on the 
North Sea Area as a whole, per capita income gains, along population expansion, took 
place gradually after the Plague. Furthermore, our results confirm the existence of Little 
Divergence that became a generalised phenomenon from the seventeenth century 
onwards. Thus, our results lend support to Broadberry-van Zanden’s interpretation. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, the long memory econometric approach 
is discussed and the available data presented. Then, we investigate the existence of 
structural breaks, the regimes they defined, and their persistence, highlighting analogies 
and differences across countries. Next, we look for Malthusian patterns in Europe and 
the onset of  modern economic growth. Finally, we assess convergence and divergence 
trends with respect to the North Sea Area.  
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2. Econometric tools 
2. 1 The long memory approach 
 One of the main characteristics of the dynamics of many economic time series is 
persistence. Economists and policy makers study the concept of persistence because of 
its key role in determining how some economic variables respond to different shocks 
over time. Persistence measures the speed at which some shocks to the particular 
economic variable die out. Traditionally, persistence has been located in two opposite 
borders. On the one hand, when a variable is stationary (weakly dependent or I(0) 
process), the time series go back to the original trend after a shock occurs. On the other, 
when the time series is non-stationary, particularly when the time series contain a unit 
root, its random behaviour makes the shock never to die out. These type of time series 
are also often called difference-stationary processes because a difference is necessary to 
transform the variable to be stationary, denoted as I(1) process.  
 A branch in econometrics has studied the concept of long memory intrinsically 
related to the measure of the persistence. The paradigm of long-range dependence 
seems to be appropriate to describe the high degree of persistence that many economic 
time series exhibit in the form of a long lasting effects of unanticipated shocks. An 
important feature of long memory models is that, even if they are stationary, will predict 
higher levels of persistence that cannot be captured by traditional stationary ARMA 
models. In this sense, long memory means that a significant dependence exists between 
observations very widely separated in time, where the effects caused by some specific 
shocks decay much more slower compared with ARMA models.1  
 Visually, an idea of long memory in the covariance sense is given by the 
behaviour of the autocorrelation function for long lags of our time series, that is, GDP 
per head for a sample of European countries over the last seven centuries (see Figure 1). 
As we detail in Appendix A (equation A.1), the fractional memory parameter 𝑑 
plays a key role in the definition of long memory, because it governs the long-run 
dynamic of the process as a measure of persistence. That is, the higher value on 𝑑, the 
longer lasting effects of shocks on the 𝑦t process.  
 
 
1 Long memory has been studied in many macroeconomic variables, Gil-Alana and Robinson (1997) 
analyse the persistence level of many macro variables, Gil-Alana (2004) measures persistence for the 
growth rates of real GDP series across various countries, while inflation rates has often been studied, 
see Baillie et al. (1996), and Canarella and Miller (2016), for instance. Readers are referred to Appendix 
A.1 for a brief technical section regarding long memory literature. 
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Figure 1. Autocorrelation Functions of  GDP per Head (logs) for the Countries’ Sample 
 
We extent the possibilities that 𝑑 may take any real number, then our analysis is 
not restricted to the cases with 𝑑 = 0 and 𝑑 = 1. Note the following implications of the 
parameter 𝑑:  
An I(0) process, i.e. a process with 𝑑 = 0, displays short memory, and implies 
that any shock that affects the series only has repercussion in the short-term because its 
impact will completely vanish in the long run. 
• The process will be stationary as long as 𝑑 < 0.5.  
• The process will be non-stationary for 𝑑 ≥ 0.5, and possesses an infinite 
variance. 
• The process will display long memory for 0 < 𝑑 < 1. 
• The process will revert to its mean as long as  𝑑 < 1. This implies that any 
shock in the process has nonpermanent effect on the series, that is, these 
shocks are transitory.  
• Processes with 𝑑 = 1 (and superior integer orders) are named ARIMA model 
and are frequently used after taking 𝑑 differences. In particular, a process with 
𝑑 = 1 implies that past innovations in 𝜖𝑡 have permanent effects on 𝑦𝑡. 
 In order to estimate this memory parameter, we use two methods. First, the Two-
Step Exact Local Whittle (2ELW) estimator proposed by Shimotsu (2010) that is very 
useful for economic data because it accommodates unknown means and polynomial 
time trends. Second, as a robustness check, we also use the fully extended local Whittle 
(FELW) estimator proposed by Abadir et al. (2007) that covers consistently a long 
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range of values with 𝑑 ∈ (−
3
2
, ∞). In the FELW procedure, the observable process may 
be driven by an additional time trend that does not have to be accounted for in contrast 
with the 2ELW procedure. 
Both estimators are consistent for 𝑑 ∈ (−
1
2
,
1
2
) ⋃ (
1
2
,
3
2
) and have the following 
limiting result 
√𝑚 ( ?̂?𝑚 − 𝑑 )
𝑑
→ 𝑁 (0,
1
4
)   as  𝑇 → ∞,   (1) 
where 𝑚 is the bandwidth, 𝑚 ∈  {𝑇0.60, 𝑇0.65, 𝑇0.70}. We use 𝑚 = 𝑇0.70 as the 
benchmark bandwidth to avoid higher-frequency contamination, while the remaining 
are useful for robustness checks. 
2.2 Test for structural breaks 
  In this paper, we make no assumptions about the existence or location of breaks. 
We highlight that one of our main goals is to estimate when a particular event really 
exerted its effects. Each pair of adjacent breaks define a period known as 'regime', 
which may not necessarily coincide with those defined by the exogenous breaks 
sometimes used in historical analysis. 
 The transcendence of structural breaks has grown with the advent of the unit 
root literature mainly as a consequence of Perron’s (1989) influential paper. The 
relevant task is to distinguish between trend-stationary and difference-stationary 
processes when the true process is subject to structural changes.2 Nevertheless, the 
methodology adopted originally by Perron (1989, 1990) has been criticized because the 
breaks are treated as known. Therefore, subsequent studies have used automatic or 
recursive tests to endogenize the break point on the grounds different data generating 
processes can be found by relaxing the exogeneity assumption of the breakpoint (Cf. 
Christiano, 1992; Zivot and Andrews, 1992; and Perron, 1997). 
We relax Crafts and Mills’s (2017) exogenous breaks approach here, and opt for 
a data-dependent algorithm to estimate the date of breaks. In our view, one never selects 
blindly a date to test for a break without prior information about the data. Then, even 
 
2 Even before this literature exploded after Perron's influential papers, we can track hundreds of 
different applications, see Hackl and Westlund (1989) for a very extensive list of references.  By the end 
of the 1980s and mostly during 1990s, structural breaks pervaded many different branches of the 
econometric literature. These include models with general stationary short-memory regressors and 
errors, trends with integrated and/or stationary errors, models with trending variables and possible unit 
roots, cointegrated models and long memory processes, multivariate systems of equations, among 
many others, see Perron (2006) and Casini and Perron (2018) for comprehensive updated reviews. See 
Mills (2016) to review the approach adopted in cliometrics. 
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when a break time based on historical events is assumed exogenously, a (hidden) data 
analysis is previously performed.3 
We use the Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a,b) (henceforth BP) structural break 
method to estimate both the number and date of structural breaks in GDP per head and 
divergence time series of the European countries’ sample in a linear regression 
framework (a methodological explanation is offered in Appendix A, section A.2). 
In our study, we are interested on testing and dating whether the linear trend of 
𝑦𝑡 changes over time. Then, we focus on the following simple specification,  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0,𝑗 + 𝛽1,𝑗 𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡,  𝑡 = 𝑇𝑗−1, … , 𝑇𝑗.             (2) 
for 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑚 + 1 , where 𝑦𝑡 is the GDP per head or divergence indices of the 
respective country analysed,  𝛽0,𝑗 and 𝛽1,𝑗 (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑚 + 1) are the parameters to be 
estimated corresponding to the intercept and the slope of the linear trend fitted to the 
variable in the 𝑗th regime. 
We determine the number of breaks and their location employing the SupF(ℓ +
1|ℓ) test described in the BP methodology, which sequentially tests the null hypothesis 
of ℓ breaks against the alternative of ℓ + 1 breaks. We calibrate the trimming parameter, 
ℎ ∈ [0.08 , 0.12], in each separate case. Finally, we estimate the fractional memory 𝑑 
by 2ELW and FELW methods explained before for each one of the regimes previously 
estimated.  
3. Data 
We have focus on a sample of seven European countries for which long series 
for real output and population are available. For all countries, but Spain, the GDP series 
from Conference Board (2019) and the Maddison Project Database (2013) have been 
used for the most recent period. The construction of homogeneous series for each 
country has been as follows. 
Italy. Conference Board (2019) series were spliced with Bafiggi’s (2012) for 
1861-2010 estimates and, then, projected backwards with Malanima’s (2011) estimates 
for North and Central Italy back to 1310, assuming the rest of the country evolved 
alongside.  
 
3 It is true that sometimes, we can have prior knowledge about the occurrence of a break, for instance, 
the Black Death; however, there may be some periods when it is really cumbersome to distinguish 
breaks, for example, between the Great Depression and the start of World War II. In such cases, one 
certainly needs to make a prior data analysis to determine what event is the actual break according to 
the information provided by the time series.  
 
 
 
 
9 
Netherlands. We have used Conference Board and Maddison Project Database 
from 1870 onwards and projected them backwards with estimates by van Zanden and 
van Leewen’s (2012) to 1807 and, then, again, to 1348, on the basis of series for the 
Holland province, under the assumption that the whole country evolved alongside.  
United Kingdom. We have started from the present day definition, Great Britain 
(that is, England, Wales, and Scotland) and Northern Ireland for which estimates exist 
back to 1870 (Bank of England, 2018) and projected them back to 1700 using 
Broadberry et al. (2015) estimates for Great Britain, and, then, for England back to 
1270. Again, we assumed that the regions not included evolved alongside. We will use 
the UK and Britain as synonymous terms in the rest of the paper.  
Spain. Prados de la Escosura (2017, updated) series for 1850-2019 were 
projected backwards to 1277 with Prados de la Escosura et al. (2020) estimates.  
Sweden. Conference Board series for 2010-2019 were projected backwards with 
Krantz and Schön’s (2007) series for 1800-2010, then, with Schön and Krantz’s (2012), 
for 1560-1800, and linked to Krantz’s (2017) series for 1300-1560.  
France. In order to derive yearly series for France over 1280-2019,  Conference 
Board and Maddison Project estimates from 1950 onwards were projected back to 1789 
with Toutain’s (1997) estimates and, then, again with a revised version of Ridolfi’s 
(2016) series to 1280.  
The reason why we have revised Ridolfi’s original series is that it presents a flat 
trend over time that we largely attribute to the way aggregate output has been 
constructed. In order to obtain per capita output, Ridolfi re-scaled agricultural output 
per head with an estimate of the share of agriculture in GDP, which was previously 
derived with the share of agriculture in total labour force and a proxy for agriculture’s 
relative labour productivity, namely, the ratio of agricultural to average wages rates. 
Here we have re-calculated Ridolfi’s (2016) output per head estimates for 1280-
1789 by combining his estimates for agricultural output with the urbanization rate, as a 
proxy for economic activity in industry and services, using fixed 1781/89 weights. This 
alternative approach employed is similar to the one used for Spain in Álvarez-Nogal and 
Prados de la Escosura (2007). In Figure 2 Ridolfi’s original and revised series for 
French GDP per head are presented along the British series. It can be noticed that while 
France would have fallen behind the UK since the mid-sixteenth century according to 
Ridolfi’s original series, with the revised series France only diverged from Britain since 
the 1680s. Both estimates probably underestimate French performance in the eighteenth 
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century (Cf. Marczewski, 1960; Morrisson, 2007; Daudin, 2011) and downplay 
France’s relative position to Britain (Crouzet, 1967), but our compromise estimates 
seem more plausible. Nonetheless, we have replicated our computations with Ridolfi’s 
original series (See Appendix B). 
  
Figure 2. Real GDP per Head in France and Britain, 1280-1789 (G-K$1990, logs) 
 
Portugal. Conference Board and Maddison Project series for 1850-2019 were 
backwards projected with Palma and Reis (2019) series to 1527.4 Out of the three 
alternative series provided by Palma and Reis (2019) using alternatively construction 
methods similar to 1) Ridolfi’s (2016) for France (IPG series), 2) Malanima’s (2011) for 
Italy (Malanima series), and 3) Álvarez- Nogal and Prados de la Escosura’s (2013) for 
Spain (ANPE series), we chose the ANPE series, although Palma and Reis favoured the 
IPG series. In addition to the reasons exposed to revise Ridolfi’s original series for 
France, we have discarded Palma and Reis’ IPG series because it suggests that, in 
$1990 terms, Portuguese per capita income was similar to the UK’s in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth century, a not very plausible result. Alternatively, the 
ANPE series, although with a similar profile to the IPG series, seem more reasonable 
with Portugal falling behind the UK since the late 1680s (Figure 3). Our computations 
have been replicated with Palma and Reis’s IPG series for Portugal (Appendix B). 
 
4 To derive yearly GDP series we had to interpolate industrial and services output to fill missing years 
between 1850 and 1865. 
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Figure 3. Real GDP per Head in Portugal and Britain, 1527-1850 (G-K$1990, logs) 
 
In order to make the series comparable in levels over space and time we have 
expressed them in Geary-Khamis 1990 dollars. Thus, for each country we have 
projected back and forth the 1990 benchmark level derived by Maddison (1995) with 
the volume indices from historical national accounts. We are aware of the shortcomings 
of the procedure followed, more specifically, the huge index number resulting from 
using a fixed benchmark level so remote, but since most of the debate has taken place in 
terms of G-K$1990 we have accepted them with all the necessary caveats (Prados de la 
Escosura, 2000). 
4. Structural breaks and its persistence in Europe over the long run 
Major disruptions, such wars and pandemics, have been deemed the main 
drivers of income distribution in the very long run (Milanovic, 2016; Scheidel, 2017). 
The enduring impact of wars provoked shifts in the relative position of countries in 
terms of income per head. Moreover, historians have established connections between 
war, state building, and economic success under Mercantilism (Findlay and O’Rourke, 
2007; O’Brien, 2018). Were wars and pandemics also the driving forces behind 
structural breaks?  
Table 1 provides information about the different regimes defined by structural 
breaks for each country in the sample, with confidence intervals, and the trend growth 
rates for per capita output in each regime. In addition, it provides the fractional memory 
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parameter of each regime estimated by 2ELW and FELW methods. Note that estimation 
of breaks depends on the trimming parameter, which was calibrated for each individual 
case. The long memory parameter is estimated with bandwidths 𝑚 = 𝑇0.70, where 𝑇 is 
the duration of each regime (also displayed in the same table) to avoid higher-frequency 
contamination.   
A first result from Table 1 appears to be that the timing of structural breaks 
largely coincides across the board. Thus, these breaks define regimes starting around 
1340-1370, 1430-1470, 1520-1570, 1620-1650, 1790s-1800s, c.1920, and c.1950. 
Why? Are there common causes of the structural breaks? 
The Black Death and its aftermath marked a structural break across the board 
ending a phase of rising output per head (regime 1, but for the Netherlands). A long 
post-Plague regime (reg. 2, but reg. 1 for the Netherlands), that largely overlapped with 
the Hundred Years’ War (1337-1453), was of recovery in some cases (Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Britain), but also of stagnation (France) and decline (Sweden and 
Spain), gave way to another break in the mid-fifteenth century. A new regime (reg. 3) 
opened, with per capita income growth in the Scandinavian and Iberian periphery, but 
stagnation in Britain and France and decline in Italy. 
 The next structural break initiated a phase (reg. 4 in most countries) that largely 
coincided with Hapsburg Spain’s European wars, including the annexation of Portugal 
(1580-1640) (reg. 2 for Portugal) and the Dutch Eighty Years’ War (1568-1648). It 
turns out that while Spain experienced the highest negative trend growth rate in any 
country of the sample during the seven century span considered, Portugal and the 
Netherlands exhibit positive trend growth. Sweden, once again, shared Spain’s fate, 
with negative trend growth. 
The strong contraction in Spain’s real output per head is associated to the efforts 
to preserve its European Empire. Sustained increases in fiscal pressure on urban 
activities, the locus of the commercial and industrial expansion in the sixteenth century, 
in order to finance increasingly expensive imperial wars in Europe, placed an 
unbearable burden on the most dynamic sectors (Parker, 1975). This triggered de-
urbanisation and led to a collapse of average real incomes from which early modern 
Spain never fully recovered (Prados de la Escosura et al., 2020). 
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Table 1  Structural Breaks, Regimes, Persistence, and Trend Growth in Europe 
 
  Regime Period Duration CI 95% FELW 2ELW CI 95% Trend Growth (%) 
SP
A
IN
 
1 1277-1341 65 -- 1.00 1.00 (0.81,1.17) 0.06 
2 1342-1440 99 (1439,1444) 0.88 0.96 (0.79,1.13) -0.27 
3 1441-1559 119 (1558,1560) 0.59 0.62 (0.46,0.77) 0.10 
4 1560-1635 76 (1634,1636) 0.50 0.16 (-0.02,0.35) -0.60 
5 1636-1794 159 (1790,1795) 0.54 0.57 (0.43,0.71) 0.19 
6 1795-1871 77 (1869,1874) 0.50 0.53 (0.34,0.71) 0.48 
7 1872-1958 87 (1957,1959) 0.87 0.92 (0.74,1.10) 0.69 
8 1959-2019 61 -- 0.95 1.00 (0.79,1.20) 2.77 
          
PO
R
T
U
G
A
L
 
1 1527-1575 49 (1573,1577) 0.52 0.91 (0.69,1.12) 0.36 
2 1576-1626 51 (1622,1630) 0.50 0.35 (0.14,0.56) 0.31 
3 1627-1698 72 (1692,1699) 0.50 0.41 (0.22,0.60) 0.29 
4 1699-1747 49 (1746,1749) 0.57 0.66 (0.44,0.87) 0.83 
5 1748-1797 50 (1794,1798) 0.50 0.66 (0.44,0.87) -0.26 
6 1798-1857 60 (1856,1861) 0.71 0.77 (0.57,0.97) 0.66 
7 1858-1916 59 (1914,1917) 0.84 0.88 (0.68,1.08) 0.65 
8 1917-1966 50 (1965,1967) 0.83 0.98 (0.76,1.19) 2.14 
9 1967-2019 53 -- 0.99 0.98 (0.77,1.18) 2.23 
          
IT
A
L
Y
 
1 1310-1369 59 (1361,1370) 0.64 0.66 (0.46,0.86) 0.13 
2 1370-1430 60 (1429,1432) -0.05 0.01 (-0.19,0.21) 0.61 
3 1431-1619 188 (1618,1628) 0.28 0.36 (0.22,0.49) -0.17 
4 1620-1710 90 (1708,1711) 0.35 0.59 (0.42,0.76) -0.07 
5 1711-1803 92 (1802,1807) 0.62 0.64 (0.46,0.80) -0.21 
6 1804-1876 72 (1875,1877) 0.43 0.51 (0.32,0.69) 0.00 
7 1876-1958 82 (1957,1959) 1.06 1.13 (0.95,1.31) 1.00 
8 1959-2019 60 -- 0.98 1.01 (0.81,1.21) 1.98 
          
FR
A
N
C
E
 
1 1280-1375 96 (1374,1376) 1.06 1.14 (0.97,1.30) 0.30 
2 1376-1471 96 (1469,1472) 1.33 1.50 (1.33,1.66) -0.01 
3 1472-1668 197 (1666,1669) 1.08 1.11 (0.98,1.24) 0.03 
4 1669-1816 148 (1815,1817) 1.13 1.02 (0.87,1.16) -0.08 
5 1817-1916 100 (1914,1917) 0.50 0.31 (0.15,0.48) 1.26 
6 1917-2019 103 -- 1.13 1.21 (1.04,1.37) 2.36 
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Table 1 (continued).  Structural Breaks, Regimes, Persistence, and Trend Growth in Europe 
 
 Regime Period Duration CI 95% ELW TSELW CI 95% Trend Growth (%) 
SW
E
D
E
N
 
1 1300-1371 72 (1368,1374) 0.99 1.13 (0.81,1.18) 0.06 
2 1372-1448 77 (1446,1449) 1.34 1.48 (1.16,1.53) -0.28 
3 1449-1523 75 (1522,1544) 1.40 1.54 (1.22,1.58) 0.34 
4 1524-1608 85 (1607,1637) 1.14 1.25 (0.96,1.31) -0.19 
5 1609-1797 189 (1794,1798) 1.26 1.31 (1.13,1.39) 0.05 
6 1798-1869 72 (1868,1870) 0.98 1.06 (0.80,1.17) 0.41 
7 1870-1946 77 (1945,1947) 0.66 0.69 (0.47,0.84) 1.84 
8 1947-2019 73 -- 1.18 1.27 (1.01,1.35) 1.98 
         
N
E
T
H
E
R
L
A
N
D
S 1 1348-1576 229 (1570,1577) 0.61 0.60 (0.46,0.74) 0.24 
2 1577-1651 75 (1647,1654) 0.22 0.23 (0.04,0.43) 0.10 
3 1652-1806 155 (1804,1807) 0.50 0.51 (0.32,0.69) 0.19 
4 1807-1946 140 (1945,1947) 0.71 0.75 (0.61,0.89) 0.79 
5 1947-2019 73 -- 1.11 1.23 (1.08,1.38) 2.23 
         
U
N
IT
E
D
 K
IN
G
D
O
M
 1 1270-1350 81 (1349,1353) 0.46 0.43 (0.23,0.63) 0.11 
2 1351-1426 76 (1425,1443) 0.53 0.60 (0.40,0.81) 0.25 
3 1427-1502 76 (1469,1505) 0.06 0.10 (-0.1,0.31) 0.00 
4 1503-1628 126 (1627,1629) 0.43 0.45 (0.27,0.62) -0.05 
5 1629-1708 80 (1707,1712) 0.50 0.47 (0.27,0.67) 0.76 
6 1709-1834 126 (1833,1835) 0.56 0.69 (0.52,0.87) 0.33 
7 1835-1920 86 (1919,1921) 0.74 0.65 (0.45,0.84) 0.95 
8 1921-2019 99 -- 0.99 1.07 (0.88,1.26) 2.08 
         
N
O
R
T
H
 S
E
A
 
A
R
E
A
 
1 1348-1427 80 (1426,1451) 0.65 0.73 (0.54,0.91) 0.29 
2 1428-1679 252 (1678,1683) 0.50 0.40 (0.28,0.52) 0.11 
3 1680-1808 129 (1807,1809) 0.54 0.57 (0.42,0.72) 0.25 
4 1809-1920 112 (1919,1921) 0.57 0.60 (0.44,0.76) 1.00 
5 1921-2019 99 -- 1.00 1.07 (0.91,1.24) 2.10 
 
Sources: See the text. 
Notes: Estimation of trending regimes by BP methodology, and estimation of memory parameters  by 
FELW and 2ELW methods with a bandwidth of m = T0.70. CI 95% represents the confidence intervals at 
95% of 2ELW estimates, and are computed using the asymptotic distribution given in equation 1. Trend 
growths are computed after estimating equation 2, and column "Trend Growth (%)" shows  slope 
estimates β̂1j × 100 in each regime j. 
 
The Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), that mostly corresponded with a major 
episode of plague, matched another structural break (reg. 5 for Spain, Sweden, and 
Britain; reg. 4 for Italy, and reg. 3 for Portugal), but for France (reg. 4), delayed to the 
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last third5 of the century, and giving way to long stagnation until Waterloo. Positive 
linear trend growth prevailed in the new regime, except in France and, once again, Italy, 
in which Britain excelled. 
Britain’s trend growth rate more than doubled any previous expansion phase in 
Western Europe. This represents an early success, at odds with the narrative that 
associates modern economic growth to the impact of the institutional changes brought 
by the Glorious Revolution (North and Weingast, 1989) and that suggests, instead, the 
effects of the institutional reforms in the aftermath of the civil war and republican rule 
(1640-83) (O’Brien, 2018).  
A less widespread structural break, involving only Portugal (reg. 4), Italy (reg. 
5), and Britain (reg. 6), happened at the time of the Spanish Succession War (1701-14) 
that led Portugal to achieve one of the fastest trend growth in pre-1820 Europe -partly 
offset by a contraction after a singular structural break in 1748-, while Britain slowed 
down, and Italy kept contracting.  
The Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815) witnessed a structural break in continental 
Europe, that was differed to the first third of the nineteenth century in the British case 
(reg. 7). The new regime brought a trend growth acceleration across the board (with 
Italy’s exception reg. 6) in which the French (reg. 5) and British economies did stand 
out. The institutional reforms triggered across western Europe by the Napoleonic 
invasion and the collapse of Absolutism may have facilitated the onset of modern 
economic growth (Pfister, 2017; Prados de la Escosura and Santiago-Caballero, 2018). 
 The last structural breaks appeared in the aftermath of the World Wars, the UK, 
Portugal (reg. 8), and France (reg. 6), after World War I and all countries, but the UK 
and France, after World War II, with positive and strong linear trend growth during the 
subsequent regimes. 
A second aspect in Table 1 to be considered is the persistence of the shocks’ 
impact in terms of memory parameter 𝑑. Pandemic disease has been recently considered 
more persistent over time than any other event, war included (Jordá et al., 2020). In the 
preindustrial world, however, the difference between the effects of pandemics and war 
was blurred as pandemics were often diffused across national boundaries by long lasting 
wars (Voigtländer and Voth, 2013a).  
 
5 To the last quarter in Rinaldi’s original GDP series are considered. 
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A glance to Table 1 suggests that the structural break originated by the Black 
Death represented a very persistent regime in Spain, France, and Sweden with 𝑑2𝐸𝐿𝑊 =
0.96, 1.14, and 1.16, respectively. This implies that the Black Death constituted a 
permanent shock in these countries until the regime transitioned to the next one. In the 
cases of Britain and the Netherlands the impact of Black Death originated a regime with 
a lower persistence (0.43 and  0.60, 𝑟espectively). Confidence intervals of 𝑑 at 95% 
cover the boundary between stationary and nonstationary regions indicating that this 
shock was neither permanent in Britain nor in the Netherlands, but it had transitory 
effects in both countries reverting to the trending path, although much more slowly than 
in Crafts and Mills (2017: 142). Only in the case of Italy a short memory process 
appears. The subsequent structural breaks, often concomitant with wars, had a lower 
degree of persistence. Only in the twentieth century, structural breaks around world 
wars, exhibit strong persistence across the board.  
It is worth pointing out that persistence varies widely across countries. Thus, 
Sweden and France (but for the nineteenth century) show strong persistence while Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom range between low and medium 
persistence during the preindustrial era. Spain presents medium levels between the mid-
fifteenth and late nineteenth centuries, but strong persistence otherwise.6 
4.1 Malthusian Europe? 
The joint outcome of wars and pandemics prior to Napoleonic Wars was, 
according to Voigtländer and Voth (2013a), an increase in the endowment of land and 
capital per survivor which resulted in higher output per head. Urbanization and military 
expenditure stimulated by higher average incomes would lead to new wars, spread of 
disease, and, thus, to another push to land and capital per worker resulting in higher 
output per head. This way, achieving higher income levels would be compatible with a 
Malthusian context.  
Does the evidence presented here fit in this interpretative framework?. In the 
North Sea Area, a permanent higher income level followed the Plague, but the structural 
break that occurred at the time had a comparatively less persistent impact in the 
Netherlands and Britain (regimes 1 and 2, respectively). Furthermore, war affected 
much less Britain than continental Europe (Figures 4a-4g).  
 
6 The results for Portugal and France in this section are similar when the alternative IPG and Ridolfi 
original GDP estimates are used (Appendix B). 
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Figure 4a. GDP per Head: Spain, 1277-2019: Trend and Original values (trimming parameter h = 0.09) 
 
 
Figure 4b. GDP per Head: Portugal, 1527-2019: Trend and Original values (trimming parameter h = 0.10) 
 
 
Figure 4c. GDP per Head: Italy, 1310-2019: Trend and Original values (trimming parameter h = 0.08) 
 
 
Figure 4d. GDP per Head: France, 1280-2019: Trend and Original values (trimming parameter h = 0.13) 
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Figure 4e. GDP per Head: Sweden, 1300-2019: Trend and Original values (trimming parameter h = 0.10) 
 
 
Figure 4f. GDP per Head: The Netherlands, 1348-2019. Trend and Original Values (h = 0.11) 
 
 
Figure 4g GDP per Head: The United Kingdom, 1270-2019: Trend and Original values (h = 0.10) 
 
Figure 4h. GDP per Head: The North Sea Area*, 1270-2019: Trend and Original Values (h = 0.10) 
* Population weighted average of British and Dutch GDP per head 
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The case of Italy, with a trend growth rate of 0.61 percent over 1370-1430, 
appears to confirm Voigtländer and Voth’s (2013b) argument that the Black Death 
would have pushed average income to high levels that would not be reached again until 
centuries later, as post-Plague income levels were not recovered there until the late 19th 
century (Figure 4c). However, a similar thrust effect of pandemics and/or war does not 
seem to have taken place in Italy again. In fact, Italian economic decline in the 
seventeenth century has been associated to severe pandemic (Alfani, 2013). 
The cases of France and Spain appear to contradict Voigtländer and Voth’s view 
because it was the pre-Plague level the one that was not reached again until the late 17th 
and early 19th century, respectively (Figures 4a and 4d).7 
The existence of Malthusian behaviour would be evinced by the opposite 
tendencies of GDP per head and population. Figures 5a-5h present, for each of the 
countries in the sample, GDP trend growth decomposed into the contributions of GDP 
per head and population in each regime. The evidence fits the Malthusian pattern for 
most countries in different periods: Britain until the seventeenth century, France up to 
the Napoleonic Wars, Italy until its Unification, the Netherlands during the late 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Sweden during the sixteenth and eighteenth 
centuries 8, and Portugal in the 1700s. However, this does not seem to fit the case of 
Sweden until the early 1500s or Spain, in which GDP per head and population evolved 
alongside over the whole considered period and, even when they show opposite signs, 
as in 1560-1635, the negative output per head growth goes along a sharp deceleration in 
population growth. 
It worth stressing that the post-Black Death trend growth acceleration appears to 
be consistent with the Malthusian narrative for most countries, but how to explain the 
negative trend growth in Spain and Sweden? The existence of a frontier economy with 
abundant natural resources and scarce population provides an explanatory hypothesis. 
The fact that factor proportions, namely, high land-labour ratios in pre-Plague Spain and 
Sweden were similar to those in post-Plague western Europe (Pamuk, 2007) helps 
explain why the Black Death had only negative consequences for their economies. In 
Spain, the pre-existing fragile equilibrium between resources and labour was broken by 
the Black Death with devastating economic consequences, despite its comparatively 
milder demographic impact (Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 2013).  
 
7 With Ridolfi’s original series France would reach pre-Plague level again in the early 19th century 
(Figure 2). 
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Figure 5a. Trend Growth in GDP and its Components: Spain, 1277-2019 (%). 
 
 
Figure 5b. Trend Growth in GDP and its Components: Portugal, 1527-2019 (%). 
 
 
Figure 5c. Trend Growth in GDP and its Components: Italy, 1310-2019 (%). 
 
 
Figure 5d. Trend Growth in GDP and its Components: France, 1280-2019 (%). 
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Figure 5e. Trend Growth in GDP and its Components: Sweden, 1300-2019 (%). 
 
 
Figure 5f. Trend Growth in GDP and its Components: the Netherlands, 1348-2019 (%). 
 
 
Figure 5g. Trend Growth in GDP and its Components: the United Kingdom, 1270-2019 (%). 
 
 
Figure 5h. Trend Growth in GDP and its Components: the North Sea Area*, 1270-2019 (%). 
            * Population weighted average of British and Dutch GDP per head 
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Furthermore, the frontier economy may also help to explain the inverse behaviour of 
Sweden and Spain to the rest of the country sample way after the Black Death. 
What does the evidence examined tells us about the origins of modern economic 
growth? All countries present trend growth reversals but the Netherlands and Britain; in 
the rest of continental Europe, irreversible growth only took place from the Napoleonic 
Wars (1793-1815) onwards and peak levels achieved in earlier periods were not 
overcome until, at least, the early nineteenth century. 
In Britain, no growth reversals exist, even though zero trend growth is found 
between 1427 and 1628, so a positive trend growth emerges since 1270. Nonetheless, 
trend growth accelerated since the first third of the 17th century, making Britain a 
precocious case in Europe. In the Netherlands, the absence of growth reversals implies a 
positive trend growth since 1348, although an acceleration took place after 1807.  
Thus, if we approach the question at individual country level, it is possible to 
claim that while the Netherlands experienced mild growth trend in real output per head 
since the post-Plague era, in the case of Britain, trend growth can be dated from the 
early 1600s, confirming previous findings by Crafts and Mills (2017). Yet, if we look at 
regions, rather than countries, it emerges that positive trend growth went along a 
sustained increase in population in the North Sea Area since the Black Death (Figures 
4h and 5h).  
5. The Little Divergence 
The absence of growth reversals in Britain and the Netherlands would explain 
why the two North Sea Area countries forged ahead the rest of Europe until World War 
I, triggering the so-called Little Divergence.  
However, the definition and timing of the Little Divergence has been rather 
casual so far. Time series analysis can be used to assess more rigorously the patterns of 
the Little Divergence between each European country and the North Sea Area, namely, 
Britain and the Netherlands, from the Black Death to the eve of World War I which is 
the relevant period for the historical debate. 
The early literature introduced the terms beta- and sigma-convergence, that 
represent an inverse association between the rate of variation and the initial level and a 
reduction of the dispersion, respectively (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). Bernard and 
Durlauf (1996) argued that the time-series approach to convergence allowed the 
distinction between weak stochastic convergence or catching-up and strong 
deterministic convergence (Cf.. Johnson and Papageorgiou, 2020). 
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In the debate on the European Little Divergence, however, none of these 
concepts are employed and instead the gap between each country and the “leader”, 
whose place is alternatively filled by Britain or the North Sea Area, has been chosen. 
Thus, a country diverges when its output per head declines relative to that of the North 
Sea Area (namely, the population average of British and Dutch per capita GDP) and, 
stricto sensu, when it falls behind.  
In this section we investigate the European Little Divergence using a time-series 
approach. We opted to follow Bernard and Durlauf’s (1996) approach extended by 
Gómez-Zaldívar and Ventosa-Santaulària (2012). The idea is that the outcomes of the 
European Little Divergence analysis are based on the statistical properties of 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡 ,  (3) 
 
where in year 𝑡, 𝑥𝑖 represents the log of GDP per head in the country 𝑖 (Spain, Portugal, 
Italy, France, or Sweden) and 𝑛𝑠𝑎 represents the log of GDP per capita in the North Sea 
area, which is taken as the "leader" in the analysis.  
 Our methodology is as follows: First, we estimate the breakpoints in 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 for each 
country 𝑖 by BP method as in Section 2 in order to identify regimes. Then, for the 
particular regime 𝑗 in the country 𝑖, we investigate  by standard econometric methods, 
which data generating process (DGP) is characterizing the process {𝑦𝑖𝑡,𝑗}𝑡=1
𝑇
, that is the 
relative income of the country 𝑖 with respect to the yardstick North Sea area along 
regime 𝑗. We have six different possibilities: 
a) Long-run convergence: the log difference in per capita GDP between country 
i and the North Sea Area (the yardstick economy) is mean-stationary, that is, country i‘s 
relative income series remains stable over time. 
b) Catching-up (lagging-behind): the relative income series (𝑦𝑖,𝑡) is stationary 
around a positive (negative) deterministic trend. 
c) Loose catching-up (loose lagging-behind) represents a weak catching-up 
(lagging-behind) as the relative income series contains a positive (negative) 
deterministic trend and a stochastic trend simultaneously. 
d) Divergence: country i‘s relative income series follows a random walk, which 
is interpreted as the disparity is unpredictable. 
 Table 2 provides the results. Let us examine each country individually. In the 
case of Spain (Figure 6a), regimes 1 (1348-1439) and 3 (1598-1690) correspond to 
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“lagging-behind”, that is, the difference in terms of per capita income deepens because 
the relative income of Spain represents a stationary series around a negative 
deterministic trend, while regime 4 (1691-1829) corresponds to “catching-up”, that is, 
Spain’s relative GDP per head series is stationary but with positive deterministic trend, 
in the Augmented Dickey-Fuller(ADF) test, but implies “long-run convergence” in the 
Phillips-Perron (PP88) test, as the relative income series is mean-stationary and the 
disparity between the per capita GDP of Spain and the North Sea Area is stable. Such 
difference is related to how the unit root test chooses the number of lags and work with 
deterministic trends. However, regime 2 (1440-1597), like regime 5 (1830-1913), would 
be of “long-run convergence”.  
 
Figure 6a. The Little Divergence: Spain and the North Sea Area, 1348-1913. 
 
 
Figure 6b. The Little Divergence: Portugal and the North Sea Area, 1527-1913. 
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Figure 6c. The Little Divergence: Italy and the North Sea Area, 1348-1913. 
 
 
Figure 6d. The Little Divergence: France (revised) and the North Sea Area, 1348-1913. 
 
 
Figure 6e. The Little Divergence: Sweden and the North Sea Area, 1348-1913. 
 
 
 
 
26 
In the case of Portugal (Figure 6b), regimes 1 (1527-1574), 2 (1575-1668), and 4 
(1715-1760) are depicted as regimes of “long-run convergence” (“catching-up” for 
regime 4, in the ADF test), while regimes 3 (1669-1714) and 6 (1818-1867) are of 
“lagging-behind”, and, in the case of regime 5 (1761-1817), is of “divergence”, a 
depiction shared by regime 7 (1868-1913).8  
A similar exercise for the case of Italy (Figure 6c) shows that the country 
experienced a process of “lagging-behind” in all regimes but in regime 2 (1413-1474) 
when exhibits “long-run convergence”, and regime 6 (1852-1913) that appears to be of 
“divergence”, that is, the series follows a random walk and its evolution is 
unpredictable.  
If the exercise is replicated for France (Figure 6d), the first four regimes, 
covering 1348-1815, are depicted as “lagging-behind”, with only regime 5 (1816-1913) 
defined as one of “catching-up”.9 
Lastly, in the case of Sweden (Figure 6e), regimes 1 (1348-1455), 3 (1524-
1596), 5 (1661-1739), and 6 (1740-1857) imply “lagging-behind”, while regimes 2 
(1456-1523), “long-run convergence”, 4 (1597-1660), “catching-up”, and 7 (1858-
1913) “loose catching-up” -meaning the simultaneous existence of a positive 
deterministic trend and a stochastic trend-.  
These results confirm that opposite tendencies gradually arose between the 
North Sea Area and the rest of the European economies with lagging-behind” (and 
“divergence”) trending regimes spreading between the aftermath of the Black Death and 
World War I. 
Can these results be interpreted in the light of the Little Divergence approach? If 
a strict definition of divergence is applied, namely, a country falling behind the North 
Sea Area in terms of GDP per head with the result of a widening gap, Spain would have 
exhibited divergence in the seventeenth century; Portugal, from late seventeenth century 
up to Utrecht peace (1713) and, again, after the Napoleonic Wars; Italy, from the late 
eighteenth century onwards, and France and Sweden between the early and late 
seventeenth century, respectively, to the Napoleonic Wars. It can be argued, then, that 
the Little Divergence gradually took place from the seventeenth century onwards. 
 We can conclude that, although different assessments of the performance of 
European countries relative to the North Sea Area derive from using a Little Divergence  
 
8 The results are very similar when the alternative IPG GDP estimates are used (Appendix B) 
9 The results are practically identical when Ridolfi’s original GDP estimates are employed (Appendix B). 
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Table 2 The Little Divergence: Structural Breaks, Regimes, and Trend 
 
 REGIME Period Breaks at 95% Duration ADF Trend Growth (%) PP88 Trend Growth (%) 
SP
A
IN
 
1 1348-1439 (1438,1446) 92 lagging-behind*** -0.210*** lagging-behind*** -0.224*** 
2 1440-1597 (1596,1604) 158 long-run convergence***  long-run convergence*** -- 
3 1598-1690 (1686,1691) 93 lagging-behind*** -0.104*** lagging-behind*** -0.105*** 
4 1691-1829 (1827,1841) 139 catching-up*** 0.015*** long-run convergence*** -- 
5 1830-1913  84 long-run convergence*** -- long-run convergence*** -- 
PO
R
T
U
G
A
L
 
1 1527-1574 (1573,1581) 48 long-run convergence* -- long-run convergence** -- 
2 1575-1668 (1664,1669) 94 long-run convergence*** -- long-run convergence*** -- 
3 1669-1714 (1713,1718) 46 lagging-behind* -0.581* lagging-behind** -0.544** 
4 1715-1760 (1759,1761) 46 catching-up** 0.085** long-run convergence** -- 
5 1761-1817 (1816,1819) 57 divergence -- divergence -- 
6 1818-1867 (1865,1868) 50 lagging-behind** -0.508** lagging-behind*** -0.610*** 
7 1868-1913  46 divergence -- divergence -- 
IT
A
L
Y
 
1 1348-1412 (1410,1420) 65 lagging-behind** -0.106** lagging-behind*** -0.131* 
2 1413-1474 (1472,1495) 62 long-run convergence*** -- long-run convergence*** -- 
3 1475-1628 (1625,1629) 154 lagging-behind*** -0.092*** lagging-behind*** -0.096*** 
4 1629-1709 (1708,1714) 81 lagging-behind*** -0.315** lagging-behind*** -0.349*** 
5 1710-1851 (1850,1852) 142 lagging-behind** -0.086** lagging-behind** -0.086** 
6 1852-1913  62 divergence -- divergence -- 
FR
A
N
C
E
 1 1348-1434 (1432,1438) 87 lagging-behind*** -0.081** lagging-behind*** -0.095** 
2 1435-1536 (1532,1545) 102 lagging-behind*** -0.133*** lagging-behind*** -0.129*** 
3 1537-1628 (1626,1630) 92 lagging-behind*** -0.063** lagging-behind*** -0.066** 
4 1629-1815 (1814,1816) 187 lagging-behind*** -0.119*** lagging-behind*** -0.141*** 
5 1816-1913  98 catching-up** 0.110** catching-up*** 0.139*** 
SW
E
D
E
N
 
1 1348-1455 (1452,1466) 108 lagging-behind** -0.042* lagging-behind** -0.048* 
2 1456-1523 (1521,1539) 68 catching-up** 0.088* long-run convergence** -- 
3 1524-1596 (1593,1597) 73 lagging-behind*** -0.101*** lagging-behind*** -0.095* 
4 1597-1660 (1659,1661) 64 catching-up** 0.299** catching-up*** 0.301*** 
5 1661-1739 (1726,1742) 79 lagging-behind*** -0.215*** lagging-behind*** -0.191*** 
6 1740-1857 (1856,1858) 118 lagging-behind*** -0.106*** lagging-behind*** -0.113*** 
7 1858-1913  56 loose catching-up 0.197* loose catching-up 0.194* 
Sources: See the text. 
Notes: Estimation of trending regimes by BP methodology. ADF corresponds to Augmented Dickey Fuller tests, while PP88 is the Phillips-Perron (1988) test. Trend Growth 
represents slope estimates × 100. Symbols *, **, and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis (unit root or significance of the trend) at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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or a convergence approach, it clearly emerges from them the North Sea Area’s 
distinctive behaviour that cumulated throughout the early modern era. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have investigated the origins of modern economic growth and 
the Little Divergence in Europe with the help of a ‘long memory’ approach. Structural 
breaks in GDP per head defining different phases or regimes are located for a sample of 
European countries over seven centuries. It is worth noting that structural breaks 
frequently coincided with wars and pandemics and those that occurred around the Black 
Death and World Wars I and II were the most persistent. 
 We find that the Black Death often resulted in higher income levels, as posited 
by Voigtländer and Voth, but the response to the Plague was far from uniform and not 
in all countries its effect was permanent. Furthermore, in frontier economies the Black 
Death affected negatively average income levels.  
Our results contradict the binary, stagnation-growth, description of pre- and 
post-Industrial Revolution economic behaviour. Historical evidence suggests a more 
nuanced view. Even if an inverse relationship between output per head and population 
tendencies is often found, the timing differs across countries and a weak, rather than a 
strict Malthusian pattern fits better the European experience, since average incomes 
were gradually lifted up between the Black Death and the Napoleonic Wars. Moreover 
exceptions to the Malthusian regime are not negligible as in frontier economies income 
per head and population evolved alongside. 
A key question in the historical debate is if the onset of modern economic 
growth took place in Europe before the mid-eighteenth century. We provide an 
affirmative answer here. When countries are considered individually, we find that, in 
Britain, trend growth in per capita income occurred since the early 1600s, while in the 
Netherlands goes back to post-Black Death era, and none of them suffered growth 
reversals since the Plague. If, alternatively, we focus on distinctive regions, we find that 
in the North Sea Area, per capita income gains, along population expansion, took place 
gradually after the Plague.  
The absence of growth reversals explain why the North Sea Area forged ahead 
the rest of Europe until World War I, prompting the Little Divergence between the early 
seventeenth century and the Napoleonic Wars. Thus, our results lend support to 
Broadberry-van Zanden’s interpretation against Goldstone’s.  
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Appendix A. Technical sections 
A.1 Long memory 
It is not easy to track the origin of long memory in literature. However, the 
initial efforts of long-range dependence in economics date back to the simultaneous 
studies of Granger and Joyeux (1980) and Hosking (1981), who introduced the 
autoregressive fractionally integrated moving average model (ARFIMA models). This 
type of processes have long lasting autocorrelations that decay hyperbolically compared 
with the geometric decay of ARMA processes. However, there is no a simple way to 
define what long memory specifically means. See Beran et. al (2016) for a review of 
long memory definitions. 
The long memory concept is defined in a covariance sense as follows: 
Definition 1. Long Memory.  
Let 𝑦𝑡 be a stationary time series with autocovariance function 𝛾𝑦(𝑘), and let 
𝑑 ∈ (0,0.5), then 𝑦𝑡 has long memory in the covariance sense if  
 γ
y
(k) ≡ cov(yt, yt+k) ≈ Cyk
2𝑑−1,  as k → ∞    (A.1) 
with 𝐶𝑦 a constant. 
 
Equation (A.1) indicates that the autocovariance function γ
y
(k) decays to zero as 
a power function of the lag k, where the decay rate is determined by the long memory 
parameter 𝑑. It is required that 𝑑 < 0.5 for covariance stationarity. Definition 1 
describes the long memory concept in the time domain sense; nevertheless, it is also 
possible to write another alternative (and interchangeably) definition of long memory in 
the spectral sense, where the long-range dependence is reflected in the spectral density 
of the time series. A formal presentation of this definition as well as the treatment of the 
spectral density is beyond the scope of this paper, however it is important to point out 
that semiparametric methods of estimating d, that employ the frequency domain, are 
mostly used in practice. 
Thus, we say that yt exhibits long memory behaviour with covariance 
stationarity if the fractional memory parameter 𝑑 ∈ (0,0.5). Sometimes, after (over) 
differencing yt, it is possible to find negative values on d, however as long as 𝑑 >
 − 0.5, the series remains invertible. Furthermore, the memory parameter can also go 
beyond the stationarity border 𝑑 =  0.5. Such cases are very useful to characterize the 
long-run behaviour of nonstationary time series by means of the class of (fractionally) 
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integrated I(d) processes, that nest the original I(0) and I(1) cases. We explain below the 
enigmatic word "fractional". 
The concept refers to the application of the specific filter (1 − L)𝑑 in terms of 
the usual lag operator L, such that for any real 𝑑 (no integer) 
(1 − L)𝑑 = ∑ ψ
j
(𝑑)Lj ,         ψ
j
(𝑑) =
Γ(j−𝑑)
Γ(j+1)Γ(−𝑑)
, j = 0,1, … ,∞j=0   (A.2) 
where Γ(z) is the gamma function, and Γ(0) Γ(0)⁄ = 1. Then, we say that yt is I(𝑑), 
that is, fractionally integrated of order d, if (1 − L)𝑑  yt ∼ I(0).  
Definition 1 basically extents the common stationary ARMA model to the 
ARFIMA models aforementioned. We explain the model below. 
The fractionally integrated process yt is defined as follows: 
(1 − L)𝑑(yt − μ) = ϵt,       (A.3) 
where yt is the time series modelled, μ is the unconditional mean of yt, the fractional 
integration parameter d is any real number (not necessary integer as in the ARIMA 
case), L is the usual lag operator, and ϵt is the usual white noise process. The operator 
(1 − L)𝑑 is the fractional difference filter defined in (A.2). 
There are different methods to estimate the fractional parameter 𝑑. Although it is 
possible to assume a parametric specification for the short memory component of yt, 
practitioners sometimes are only interested in the parameter d in definition 1. In such 
cases, semiparametric methods originally proposed by Geweke and Porter-Hudak 
(1983), rely on the periodogram of yt to estimate d. In this type of estimation methods, 
the bandwidth (m) is a tuning parameter and defines how small or how large the 
vicinity to the origin is, relative to the sample size. These methods belong to a family of 
semiparametric estimators called Local Whittle (LW) and evaluate the periodogram of 
yt only locally, in a vicinity of the origin, where the spectral density of yt is driven only 
by the memory parameter 𝑑 (Velasco, 2006). In this light, many different estimators 
have been proposed in the literature.  
Robinson (1995b) introduces a Gaussian semiparametric estimate (referred as 
LW estimates) of d, based on the minimization of a local Whittle frequency domain log-
likelihood, but only in the stationary region, that is for 𝑑 ∈ (−0.5 , 0.5). This 
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framework is revised and extended in some other papers, see Velasco (1999a, 1999b) 
for the region 𝑑 ∈ (−1/2 , 3/4 ), for instance. Moreover, Shimotsu and Phillips (2005) 
study consistency and limiting normality beyond the unit root case and 𝑑 = 3/4 in their 
procedure called Exact Local Whittle (ELW). The Two-Step Exact Local Whittle 
(2ELW) and the fully extended local Whittle (FELW) estimators used in this paper are 
sophisticated versions of the LW and ELW estimators aforementioned. For further 
details of the estimation methods as well as many other procedures to estimate the long 
memory parameter, cf. Beran et al. (2016). In Table 1, we show the memory parameters 
estimates of the GDP per head for our sample of seven European countries over the last 
seven centuries.  
 
Table A.1. Long Memory Estimates for the Full Period of Each Country 
 
LW ELW 2ELW FELW  
Bandwidth (m=T^) 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.60 0.65 0.70  
Spain 1.00 1.12 1.08 1.15 0.99 0.97 1.15 1.14 1.10 1.14 1.14 1.10  
Portugal 1.02 1.06 1.01 1.13 0.96 0.93 1.13 1.07 1.02 1.13 1.07 1.02  
Italy 1.07 1.09 1.00 1.21 1.04 0.99 1.21 1.10 1.02 1.21 1.10 1.02  
France 1.00 1.06 1.06 1.20 0.98 0.99 1.21 1.08 1.07 1.21 1.07 1.07  
Sweden 0.99 0.99 0.90 1.15 0.95 0.93 1.15 1.01 0.92 1.14 1.00 0.92  
Netherlands 0.96 0.91 0.91 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.95 0.92 0.92  
United Kingdom 0.99 0.97 0.96 1.10 0.98 0.98 1.10 1.01 0.99 1.08 1.00 0.98  
North Sea Area 0.98 1.03 0.99 1.09 0.96 0.95 1.09 1.05 1.01 1.08 1.04 1.00  
Sources: See the text. 
Note: For all countries, standard deviations are 0.07, 0.06, and 005 for cases with  m = T0.6, m = T0.65,  
and m = T0.7, respectively. LW refers to Local Whittle of Robinson (1995b), ELW refers to Exact Local 
Whittle of Shimotsu and Phillips (2005), 2ELW refers to Two-Step Exact Local Whittle (2ELW) of 
Shimotsu (2010) and FELW refers to the fully extended local Whittle of Abadir et al. (2007). 
 
A.2 Testing for structural breaks 
The method proposed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a,b) has been widely used 
in different applications mostly because it can deal with multiple structural breaks in 
contrast with classical tests that often consider a single change or assume the timing and 
the type of change are known. The most important characteristic of the BP method is 
the assumption that the potential structural breakpoints are unknown and to determine 
endogenously the structural breaks dates. 
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The general framework of BP analysis can be described by the following 
multiple linear regression model with m breaks, that is m + 1 regimes, 
yt = xt
′β + zt
′δj + ut,               t = Tj−1 + 1, … , Tj,    (A.4) 
for j = 1, … , m + 1, where yt is the dependent variable at time t, xt and zt are (p × 1) 
and (q × 1) vector of covariates with β and δj (j = 1, … , m + 1) are their 
corresponding vector of coefficients, and ut is the usual disturbance at time t. Since the 
method treats the break points indices, (T1, … , Tm), as unknown, then the goal is the 
joint estimation of the unknown parameters together with the break points. Note that the 
parameter β is not subject to shifts in equation (A.4).  
The methodology is valid under fairly general assumptions (cf. Krämer, et al. 
1988; and Bai, 1997). In a nutshell, assumptions are satisfied if {ut}  is a martingale 
difference with ut independent of the explanatory variables, which need to be (almost) 
stationary. Trending regressors are permitted, which is in line with our purposes. 
The BP testing procedure allows for up to nine breaks and up to ten regressors 
whose coefficient are the object of the test as mentioned before. The asymptotic critical 
values are computed by Bai and Perron (1998) via simulations. BP methodology 
employs a sequential F test to infer how many shifts have the time series. The idea is 
that the full sample is divided into subsamples depending of a trimming parameter that 
defines the minimal segment size that may be given as fraction relative to the sample 
size. Such trimming parameter is chosen and calibrated by the practitioner.  
As mentioned in the Section X, we consider the following setup,  
yt = β0,j + β1,j t + ut,  t = Tj−1, … , Tj.              
for j = 1, … , m + 1 . Then, we are concerned with testing the hypothesis that the 
regression coefficients remain constant, that is, 
H0:  βi = β0     (i = 0, 1),                                                  (A.5) 
against the alternative that at least one of parameters (β0, β1) varies over time. The 
intuition is that both coefficients shift from one stable linear trend to a different one as a 
consequence of a particular historical event. Therefore, we have m + 1 regimes in 
which the trend is stable.  
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Following Bai and Perron (1998), the multiple structural changes are identified 
in the following manner: For each m-subsamples (T1, … , Tm), denoted {Tj}, the least 
squares estimates of β0,j, and β1,j are obtained by minimizing the sum of squared 
residuals 
ST(T1, … , Tm) = ∑ ∑ [yt − β0,j + β1,j t]
2Ti
t=Ti−1+1
m+1
j=1 ,      (A.6) 
where ST represents the sum of squared residuals in m-partition. Let β̂0({Tj}) and 
β̂1({Tj}) denote the resulting estimates. Next, substituting these into Equation (A.6), 
gives the estimated break points 
(T̂1, … , T̂m) = argmin
T1,…,Tm
ST(T1, … , Tm),       (A.7) 
where the minimization is taken over all partitions (T1, … , Tm). This means that the 
break-points estimators are global minimizers of the objective function. The BP method 
efficiently solve the minimization problem by dynamic programming. Zeileis et al. 
(2003) implement the algorithm using the R system for statistical computing. 
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Appendix B. Alternative Estimates for Portugal (IPG) and France 
(Rinaldi original) 
 
 
Table B.1  Structural Breaks, Regimes, Persistence, and Trend Growth in Portugal 
(IPG) and France (Ridolfi) 
 
  Regime Period Duration CI 95% FELW 2ELW CI 95% Trend Growth (%) 
PO
R
T
U
G
A
L
 
1 1527-1575 49 (1574,1577) 0.52 0.91 (0.69,1.12) 0.43 
2 1576-1626 51 (1607,1628) 0.50 0.35 (0.14,0.56) 0.28 
3 1627-1694 68 (1692,1696) 0.50 0.41 (0.22,0.60) 0.59 
4 1695-1749 55 (1748,1750) 0.57 0.66 (0.44,0.87) 0.62 
5 1750-1799 50 (1794,1800) 0.50 0.66 (0.44,0.87) -0.46 
6 1800-1858 59 (185651860) 0.71 0.77 (0.57,0.97) 0.27 
7 1859-1916 58 (1914,1917) 0.84 0.88 (0.68,1.08) 0.66 
8 1917-1966 50 (1965,1967) 0.83 0.98 (0.76,1.19) 2.14 
9 1967-2019 53 -- 0.99 0.98 (0.77,1.18) 2.23 
          
FR
A
N
C
E
 
1 1280-1374 95 (1374,1377) 1.06 1.14 (0.97,1.30) 0.40 
2 1375-1547 173 (1547,1548) 1.33 1.50 (1.33,1.66) -0.10 
3 1548-1678 131 (1677,1680) 1.08 1.11 (0.98,1.24) 0.10 
4 1679-1816 138 (1815,1817) 1.13 1.02 (0.87,1.16) 0.00 
5 1817-1916 100 (1914,1917) 0.50 0.31 (0.15,0.48) 1.30 
6 1917-2019 103 -- 1.13 1.21 (1.04,1.37) 2.40 
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Table B.2 The Little Divergence: Structural Breaks, Regimes, and Trend in Portugal (IPG) and France (Ridolfi) 
 
  REGIME Period Breaks at 95% Duration ADF Trend(%) PP Trend(%) 
P
O
R
TU
G
A
L 
1 1527-1574 (1573,1581) 48 divergence -- long-run convergence* -- 
2 1575-1668 (1664,1669) 94 catching-up*** 0.084*** long-run convergence*** -- 
3 1669-1714 (1713,1718) 46 lagging-behind** -0.622** lagging-behind*** -0.547*** 
4 1715-1760 (1759,1761) 46 catching-up* 0.073** long-run convergence** -- 
5 1761-1817 (1816,1819) 57 divergence -- divergence -- 
6 1818-1867 (1865,1868) 50 lagging-behind** -0.888** lagging-behind*** -0.932*** 
7 1868-1913   46 divergence -- divergence -- 
                  
FR
A
N
C
E 
1 1348-1435 (1432,1438) 88 lagging-behind*** -0.124*** lagging-behind*** -0.131*** 
2 1436-1569 (1532,1545) 134 lagging-behind** -0.080*** lagging-behind*** -0.093*** 
3 1570-1679 (1626,1630) 110 lagging-behind*** -0.007*** lagging-behind*** -0.007*** 
4 1680-1816 (1814,1816) 137 lagging-behind*** -0.063*** lagging-behind*** -0.081*** 
5 1817-1913   97 catching-up** 0.110** catching-up***  0.139*** 
 
 
Sources: See the text. 
Notes: Estimation of trending regimes by BP methodology. ADF corresponds to Augmented Dickey Fuller tests, while PP88 is the Phillips-Perron (1988) test. Trend Growth 
represents slope estimates × 100. Symbols *, **, and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis (unit root or significance of the trend) at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Figure B.1a. GDP per Head: Portugal (IPG), 1527-2019: Trend and Original Values (h=10) 
 
 
 
Figure B.1b. GDP per Head: France (Ridolfi original series) 1280-2019 Trend and Original Values (h=0.13)  
 
 
 
Figure B.2a. Trend Growth in GDP and its Components: Portugal (IPG), 1527-2019 (%). 
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Figure B.2b. Trend Growth in GDP and its Components: France, 1280-2019 (%) (Rodolfi original series) 
 
 
Figure B.3a. The Little Divergence: Portugal (IPG) and the North Sea Area, 1527-1913. 
 
 
 
Figure B.3b. The Little Divergence: France (Ridolfi original) and the North Sea Area, 1348-1913. 
 
 
